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Copyright Protection of Computer Software:
History, Politics, and Technology
by Scott L. Garren
Abstract
The protection of computer software, especially in the area of user interface design,
called "look and feel," is the subject of great controversy today. The underlying
causes of the controversy are examined and the need for new approaches in dealing
with the problem is established, particularly in the light of a recent landmark case in
this area, Lotus Development Corp v. Paperback Software, Intemational
In order to determine what these approaches might and might not be, it will be useful
to study the role of the Congress, the courts, the Federal bureaucracy and industry
practice in shaping copyright reform during the twentieth century. Each of these
contributors to the formation of copyright law has developed areas of special
competency and encountered limits on their actions, as will be seen through the
examination of selected case histories.
This paper concludes by analyzing the impact that each of these four groups is likely
to have on solving the look and feel problems we face in the computer industry today
in the light of their historical experiences.
Thesis Supervisor:
Title:
Dr. William B. Watson
Professor of History
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Introduction
" The Law embodies the story of a nation's development through many
centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms
and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is,
we must know what it has been and what it tends to become. We must
alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the
most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the two
into new products at every stage."
- The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1881 1)
In June, 1990, Federal District Court Judge Keeton handed down a ruling in the
closely watched case of Lotus Development Corporation v. Paperback Software,
International and Stephanson Software, Ltd.. 1 This case was the latest in a series of
cases exploring the limits of copyright protection of computer software. The subject
is a controversial one. It has sparked demonstrations of programmers at Lotus
Development Corporation's headquarters, It has caused the Senior Corporate
Council in charge of intellectual property and antitrust litigation at IBM to write a
book expounding his views on the subject (Clapes 1989). It has been the subject of
Congressional hearings, and it has devoured hundreds of pages of coverage in law
journals.
The subject generates passion because computer software is a large and rapidly
growing business. According to the National Research Council (1984 29) in 1984
there were over 14,000 enterprises in the United States producing programs for sale,
and the value of software sold was growing at over 30% a year. By 1984 sales had
reached $8 billion dollars in the United States alone. Software is also a key to the
1740 F.Supp. 37; 15 USPQ 2d 1577; CCH Comp. Law 46,310 U.S. District Court,
District of Massachusetts No. 87-76-K June 28, 1990
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sale of computer hardware worth over $100 billion world wide. In many industries
competitive status is impacted significantly by the quality of a company's software.
Given these high stakes, it is not surprising that legal controversies have arisen over
software. The outcome of these battles will have an important impact on the world
economy in the decades ahead.
The system that creates and implements the laws that govern the protection of
software in the United States is complex. It consists, first, of the legislatures - both
state and federal- which formulate legislation; the courts, which interpret that
legislation in the context of individual cases; an administrative bureaucracy that
administers the laws passed by Congress; and all of this takes place in the context of
accepted industry practice. There has been much written about the issue of legal
protection of software in the legal, business and general press. Little attention,
however, has been paid to the complex system by which this protection has evolved
and is currently provided.
In this thesis I will examine the problems we face today in applying copyright law to
the protection of computer software. I will then examine the functioning of the
Congress, courts, bureaucracy and industry practice in shaping copyright law during
the twentieth century. By observing the workings of this system in various similar
situations in the past we can gain important insight into the ways in which the
components of this system behave and the forces influencing them. Based on these
insights gained, I will then explore the roles that these players are likely to have in
resolving the problems we face today.
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Chapter 1: Copyright Protection For Computer Software
The first working prototype of an electronic, digital computing device was built in
1938 (Burks 1988). Through the next 40 years of computer development there was
relatively little legal activity regarding the protection of software. Computers were
rare and expensive items sold only to large corporations. Computer programs were
written almost exclusively either by computer manufacturers to make the systems
more useable, useful, and thus more easily sold, or they were written by the
purchasers of these big computer systems to reflect the specific business needs of
their organizations. Software written by computer manufacturers did not need
protection because it was closely tied to the manufacturer's unique hardware.
Software written by users was easily protected as trade secrets, since it was not
available for sale and did not leave the user's premises.
Computer systems were big and expensive and were purchased only by very large or
wealthy organizations. The purchasers of such systems accepted the fact that there
was no commercially available software that would make the computers useful. Such
software had to be created from scratch. While there were a limited number of
patents issued covering software, most legal protection of this investment in software
it was under the law of trade secrets and contracts.
By the late 1970's, the computer industry was changing as the mini-computer was
becoming commonplace. The cost of computers was declining rapidly and their
numbers grew in proportion. The numbers of programmers in the world increased to
match the growth in demand, the size of the market place for software expanded,
and so did interest in the legal protection of software.
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Objects such as software are an instance of what lawyers call intellectual property.
There are four areas of the law that provide protection for intellectual property:
patents, copyrights and trademarks and trade secrets. Patents protect ideas
embodied in "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter".2 Copyright
covers communication through the written or spoken word, music or other works of
authorship.3 Trademark covers identity, as embodied in word, name, symbol or
device.4 Trade secret law covers valuable commercial information developed by a
company that gives it commercial advantage over its competitors. Patents, copyright
and trade secrets all offer possible solutions to the problem of protecting the growing
investment in software.
Patents are the vehicle for protecting novel, non-obvious and useful machines,
processes, articles of manufacture and composition of matter. Edwin Land's patents
on various processes of instant photography and Xerox's patents on the dry copy
process are well know examples of patents. Patent protection is broader than that
provided by copyright. Whereas a copyright merely prevents the copying of a work, a
patent prevents the use of the patented item in any form or matter. While the scope
of protection provided by a patent is greater than that offered by a copyright, it is
made available by Congress much more sparingly. Only novel items that would not
be obvious to the skilled practitioner in the field can be granted patent protection
whereas anything original to an author is protected by copyright.
235 USC S. 101
3 Strong (1990 13)
4Davis (1985 163). Trademarks are potentially very valuable properties that must be
vigorously protected but do not play a significant role in the area we are investigating.
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Trade secrets are covered by state law rather than federal law and so vary from place
to place but the definition of a trade secret in the California Penal Code is typical of
that it most states:
"'Trade Secret' means the whole or any portion or phase of any
scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula,
or improvement which is secret and is not generally available to the
public, and which gives one advantage over competitors who do not
know or use the trade secret; and a trade secret shall be presumed to
be secret when the owner takes measures to prevent it from becoming
available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have
access thereto for limited purposes. '"5
Trade secret law provides important protection for source code of software products,
file formats, and other internal details involved in the design, manufacture and
marketing of software products. According to Davis (1985 33) the requirement of
secrecy and limited distribution, which is an essential part of the definition of a trade
secret, means that any widely distributed software product is not a trade secret and is
not protected by this body of law. Since the appearance and behavior of a program
to it's users are it's most public aspect, trade secret law is not relevant to the disputes
we are addressing here.
This last area of intellectual property protection, copyright, is the main subject of
this paper. Copyright is an internationally recognized set of laws that protect the
creators of various forms of communication in many different media. Copyright
covers writing, painting, music, mime, architecture, graphic design, and computer
software and databases, to mention a few. The kinds of media covered include just
-9-
5Davis (1985 31)
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about anything: paper, film, video, sound recordings, film and computer readable
media are some of the most important media protected by the copyright statute.
When legal protection of software products became desirable, the authors of
software turned primarily to copyright. If patents offer stronger protection than
copyrights, one might wonder why copyright was more often chosen as the legal
vehicle to provide protection of software. Surely the seventeen years covered by
patents would be sufficient for most software, since it is unlikely that any software
written today would have much commercial value given the likelihood that more
powerful computers and systems would be developed in the intervening seventeen
years and render such software obsolete.
Patents, however, are not the main vehicle used to protect software because of the
limits on the availability of patents, because of the bureaucratic systems used to
administer them and because of the disclosure requirements built into the patent
system. According to Davis (1985 160) there are many reasons why patents do not
provide the main basis for the protection of software. Patent applications are long,
complex documents that require a patent lawyer's expensive assistance to complete.6
The Patent Office then can take years to review the application and rule on its
validity. No protection is available until the patent is granted, and preliminary
injunctions are rarely granted against alleged infringers. Thus it is likely to take five
years from patent application until one can actually stop an infringer. This is not
acceptable given the fast pace of development in the software market today.
Moreover litigating a patent infringement is more complex and costly than litigating
6It takes over two years to process most patent applications and the associated legal
fees range from $2,500 to $25,000.
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copyright infringement, and there are no provisions in patent law for recovering legal
fees.
Last, and most importantly, patents can only be granted to ideas of considerable
novelty, ideas that are not obvious to the trained practitioner, whereas copyright
requires only originality, that is independent creation by the author. Most software
today contains far more originality than novelty as these terms are used in this legal
context. Thus while software patents are available and can offer strong protection to
the holder, they are not the primary means of software protection relied upon in
industry today. The Patent Office currently is issuing about 100 patents a month as
compared with Schmidt's (1981 347) estimate of 15,000 computer programs written
every day in the United States all of which are automatically protected by copyright.
In 1976, in their general rewriting of the copyright statutes, Congress saw a need to
protect software and added it to the list of protected classes. However, as they were
unclear as to exactly what software should be protected and how broad that
protection should be, they qualified the new law by saying it was not to be interpreted
as offering any broader protection than the earlier, 1909 law. Since the extent of
coverage of software under the 1909 law was completely unsure, the 1976 revision
was cold comfort to the software industry (Clapes 1989 17). Congress was in fact just
buying themselves time on this issue since they had, two years earlier in 1974, created
the National Commission on the New Technological Users of Copyrighted Works,
know by the shorthand CONTU, to fully explore these issues and make legislative
recommendations to Congress.
CONTU met over the course of several years, heard testimony from witnesses from
many sectors of the computer industry, and published a thick report. For all of this,
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their legislative recommendations were few and modest. They recommended to
Congress that a definition of a computer program be added to the law, as well as
wording providing for user's right to make a backup copy of copyright software for
archival purposes, and allowing the user to load software into his computer for use
without infringing the copyright.
Against this background of legislative action has unfolded a sequence of court cases
that has granted very broad protection to computer software under copyright. Since
the history of these cases has been described previously, I will not repeat them in
detail great here.7 I will, however, summarize the key questions addressed by these
cases to give a feel for the current status of software protection under copyright.
o Software is copyrightable in object code as well as source code, in
ROM as well as other media. 8
o The translation of a program from one language or operating
environment to another is the creation of a derivative work and is the
exclusive right of the copyright owner. 9
o The detailed structure, sequence and organization of a program is
protected by copyright.1 0
7Lynch, Steinber and Clapes (1987) and Clapes (1989) present the history from a
strongly pro-protection viewpoint. Clapes is Senior Corporate Council at IBM in
charge of intellectual property and anti-trust at IBM. Samuelson (1984) and Kajala
(1987) present the view for limited protection. Davis (1985) is a discussion of the
practical implications for the software practitioner.
8Williams Electronics v. Arctic International 685 FSupp2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) and
Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. 545 FSupp. 812 (D.E.D. Pa. 1982)
9SAS Institute, Inc. v. S&H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 FSupp. 816 (M.D. Tenn.
1985)
0Wizelan, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. , 609 FSupp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
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In these cases the courts took copyright doctrine worked out over many years in
settling issues regarding literary and dramatic works and applied them to software.
There are certainly many similarities between software and works of literary
creativity that make such parallels plausible. Success in both areas involve perfecting
the elements of logic, structure, and flow to best express the author's intent.
Brown (1988), Karjala (1987), and Strong ( 1990), among others, have argued,
however, that the utilitarian nature of software makes it different from other literary
works. They argue that the nature of the task that software is trying to accomplish,
along with the need for efficiency in the end product limit the range of possible
expression and thus make it unreasonable to protect software or if protected at all
only against the most literal of copying.11 There may be very narrow areas where
such logic applies but the significant dissimilarities among the many word-processing
applications, database products and many other classes of applications contradict this
logic. Any computer user who has grown accustomed to using a particular product
and then is forced to adapt to another one can attest to the wide range of expression
that is possible fro software programs whose basic purpose and logic may be the
same. Indeed diversity of applications seems inevitable in the real world of software.
There is another set of court cases involving software's presentation to the user, the
so called user interface, which has created much greater controversy than the cases
mentioned above. It is exactly on the issue of the user's investment in learning how
to use software products that these court rulings have floundered. These cases are
nClapes (1989) argues, correctly in my view, that literature also involves efficiency.
The best literature is often that which most directly and compellingly, indeed
efficiently, leads the reader to the authors goal.
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known as "look and feel" cases since they address the way the software looks to the
user in terms of screen design and layout, and the way they feel, or react to input
from the user.
A series of "look and feel" case rulings at the District and Circuit court levels have
drawn the same lines of strict protection around the user interface of computer
applications as was drawn around other software features. In this series of cases the
courts have found:
o That a copyright protects at least the expressive elements of the
display screens created by a program. 1 2
o That computer screen displays may be copyrighted separately as
audio-visual works.13
o That commands and simple one or two letter abbreviations are
protected by copyright.14
These decisions have caused great controversy in the computer industry and legal
profession. They have the effect of causing software companies that wish to write a
product that improves on the operation of a competitive product to write a
gratuitously different user interface just to avoid copyright infringement. That is,
their programs must look different not because such a difference is an improvement
12Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
13Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softclone Distributing Corp., 659 FSupp.
449 (N.D. Ga. 1987)
1'4 dem
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over the original or because they could not independently develop a similar user
interface but merely because the look had been copyrighted.
In my view, these cases are both bad for the computer industry, bad for the law and,
in the end, bad for the country. They value the author's investment in writing user
interface software above the far larger investment of time users of these software
products make in training costs while learning to master such products. As a
concrete example, it has been estimated by Weigner (1989 130) that the average
Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet software user spends $1,000 in training costs of all sorts
while mastering the product. Lotus 1-2-3 has a suggested retail price of $495. With
over 10,000,000 copies of Lotus 1-2-3 in use that means that users have spent over
$10 billion learning to use the product while Lotus spent only about $305 million in
total research and development.15 The real value of the user-interface of most
software is not in the designing and creating of it but rather in the user's effort to
master it. Current software look and feel rulings do not take into account this
balance of equities between the users and the authors of software products.
Moreover, once users have made this investment in learning how to run a product,
they become loath to change. This can be seen very clearly in the case of the
typewriter keyboard. The original QWERTY keyboard was designed to put
frequently used keys in inconvenient locations to slow down proficient typists who
would otherwise jam the temperamental machinery of early typewriters That we
have stayed with this inefficient keyboard design speaks to the great inertia users
have in such matters. Imagine if a copyright had been granted for the QWERTY
keyboard, giving it's creator a life plus 50 year monopoly. Anyone else seeking to
'
5This is the total R&D on all Lotus products. It is unlikely that developement of the
user interface of their 123 product accounted for more that $15 million.
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improve on the first typewriter would have had to build a different layout for his
keyboard. Touch typing skills learned on one manufacturer's typewriter would not
be transferable to another machine. Surely this would not be good for society.
Another example of the power of the computer users' desire for standardization is in
the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program and the Ashton Tate Dbase III data-base
product. These products are among the best selling software packages today. They
both have become corporate standards at many large organizations and are the best
selling in their product categories by far16. Yet research by PC Week has shown
them to rank among the very lowest on evaluation criteria that users judge as most
important to their work.17 This phenomenon, like the longevity of the QWERTY
keyboard, is powerful testimony to the value of the investment users make in learning
new technologies. Copyright doctrine needs to recognize users as a major
contributor of value in cases like this.
The cost of this failure to recognize the value of the user's investment is significant.
Users pay higher prices because of the monopoly prices that vendors can charge.
New technology becomes available much more slowly because of the lower levels of
competition that ensue. Users suffer lower levels of productivity because of the
poorer quality tools available to them. The users' return on their investment in
computer hardware and software is diminished by these higher costs and lower
product quality. As the most heavily computerized of all the major industrial nations
the United States will suffer lower productivity and our international competitiveness
will diminish as a result.
'
6See New York Times, 1-Feb-91 pD3(4) and PC Week 13-Nov-89 p163
17See PC Week, 1-Oct-90 p58 and PC Week 2-Oct-89 p50
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The Lotus Case
The case of Lotus Development Corporation v. Paperback Software International is in
many ways the culmination of this entire chain of cases. It represents an earnest
attempt on the part of the judge in the case, Robert Keeton, to definitively address
the issues involved in copyright protection of a program's user interface in the
context of Lotus 1-2-3, which is one of the biggest selling software products of all
time.18 Since Judge Keeton has issued a wide-ranging ruling, in what is sure to
become a widely cited case, it is worth taking a close look at some of his arguments.
The first question Keeton addresses is the copyrightability of computer software.
Since Congress adopted the recommendations of CONTU and passed the 1980
amendment to the copyright law there is no question that computer programs are
entitled to some type of protection by copyright. The issues remain what aspects of a
computer program are protected and what constitutes infringement. Keeton admits
that both the statute itself and the CONTU report are silent on the issue of
copyrightability of non-literal aspects of computer programs. He then admits that
the courts had earlier found in Synercom19 that the order and sequence of data input
was inseparable from idea and thus not copyrightable. He points out that this ruling
from 1978 was before the CONTU report and the 1980 Congressional action. He
also points to other more recent cases which have held that non-literal elements of a
computer program are covered by copyright. He uses these facts to justify ignoring
Synercom in this instance.
18Lotus has sold 6,000,000 copies of 1-2-3 and has over 10,000,000 users as of the end
of 1990, according to Candice Clemens, of Lotus in a telephone communication.
19Synercom Technology, inc. v. University Computing Co. 462 FSupp 1003 (D. N.D.
Tex. 1978)
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Keeton, in my judgement, is making a mistake here. The other cases he cites are
primarily addressing instances where defendants took flow charts, documentation, or
the actual computer code itself and used them to copy the overall structure of the
original work. These efforts are similar to translations or other derivative works
which take the investment of the original author and appropriate it for the benefit of
the copier. In Lotus, as in Synercom, however the issue is preserving the investment
the user makes in preparing data and spreadsheets. Paperback Software was not
alleged to have had access source code or flowcharts of 1-2-3. Keeton has
fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the investment at issue here.
Next Keeton addresses the sharp limitations in the copyright law on the protection of
useful objects. The statute defines a useful article as "an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information," and the statute limits the protection of such an object only to
such esthetic elements as are clearly separable from the function of the object.
Keeton then uses an earlier ruling that held that just because a book was useful did
not mean it was a "useful article" under the law and thus exempt from protection. He
then asserts that virtually any successful program is useful and that the statute could
not possibly have meant to eliminate all protection for software. After all, the
copyright statute explicitly defines computer programs and conditions under which
their users can copy them. Keeton is again very wide of the mark. An atlas or text
book is not a "useful article" under the law since their purpose is precisely to "convey
information". The purpose of Lotus 1-2-3 is not to convey information. The
information is added by the user. Lotus 1-2-3 has "an intrinsic utilitarian purpose,"
which is to run spreadsheet programs written by its users. Thus under the law only
expressive elements clearly separable from 1-2-3's purpose are protected. The
command structure and macro language are essential to its purpose since they are
-18-
the building blocks of the user's spreadsheet. Change the command structure and
the spreadsheet no longer runs.
Lastly Keeton discusses standards and how they affect this case. Paperback Software
claimed that the Lotus 1-2-3 commands were an industry standard and that they had
to implement them. Keeton points to another spreadsheet product, Excel from
Microsoft, as an example of a successful competitor that was not compatible with
Lotus 1-2-3 but instead had provided a translator to make migration possible for
Lotus users.
This argument is flawed on two grounds. The first is practical. Microsoft is the
biggest PC software company in the world. Excel has been rated by most analysts as
a far superior product to Lotus 1-2-3. Yet, according to Computer Intelligence PC
Market Monitor Service, Excel has a static 10-12% market share whereas Lotus'
market share is stable at 60-70%. For a company like Microsoft a 10-12% market
share is not success. The second problem with Keeton's argument is that if the
macro and command language were indeed covered by copyright, then Microsoft's
translator of Lotus 1-2-3 macros would surely be a derivative work and thus a
copyright infringement.
The courts have created a problem for us in these mistaken rulings. How to fix these
problems so that we can achieve a balance of equities between the users and
producers of software products is an important question. There have been a wide
range of suggestions as to how to accomplish this goal, usually involving legislation
that would remove software as a class protected by the copyright statute and
substitute new legislation of a more limited scope, tailored to the protection of
-19-
software.20 All of these suggestions are plausible, and all take large steps toward
addressing this dilemma. In many ways, however, they are contradictory and vary
significantly in the procedures they recommend.
Somewhere among these suggestions is probably a good solution to our problem, but
how do we evaluate them? How can we tell which ones are likely to work? For a
change in copyright policy to be accepted it must meet three criteria. First it must be
politically viable, especially if it requires Congressional action to implement. Second
it must be procedurally practical. This question must be viewed internationally since
much of the market and competition is international in scope. Lastly the changes
must make sense given the state of computer technology. In order to assess these
issues we need to know who is involved in making copyright law and policy and to
understand how these groups currently function in establishing copyright practice.
20See Brown (1988), Englund (1990), Kapor (1990), Karjala (1987), Samuelson
(1988), Strong (1990).
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Chapter 2: How Does Copyright Law Get Made?
Copyright law and practice is a complex mixture of legislation, court interpretation,
bureaucratic regulation and industry practice. All of these parts are relevant to the
problem of balancing the equities involved in computer software protection. To best
see our way through the complexity of the look and feel controversy we need to
understand how these components of the copyright legal system have functioned in
the past, both remote and recent. In the next four chapters we will look at each of
these actors in turn by examining one important historical contribution each one
made to copyright practice during the twentieth century. These cases span the time
period from 1905 to 1977.
Federal copyright practice is first of all the creation of legislation. The current
federal copyright law completely preempts and incorporates common law copyright
for all works once fixed in a tangible media (Strong 1990 68), so almost all copyright
practice follows from the federal statute. We will look at the workings of the
legislature in defining copyright practice through the piano roll case. This case is an
important one not only because it illuminates the workings of Congress, but also
because it introduced the concept of compulsory licensing, which has promise as part
of the solution to our software look and feel problems.
The courts have also played an important part in developing software copyright law
and practice. The conservative critics of judicial activism are completely right in their
assertions that the courts often make law. Their conclusion that this an
inappropriate role for the courts is wrong, in my view, because often there is no other
practical alternative. As long as the courts make law they must be understood and
dealt with as contributors to the evolving doctrine and practice of copyright law. A
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good example of the evolution of copyright protection through the courts rather than
through explicit legislation is the protection afforded to motion pictures, a subject
which I will examine in chapter 4.
The day to day functioning of the copyright system is implemented by a bureaucracy,
the Library of Congress' Copyright Office. The Copyright Office is supposed to
implement the wishes of Congress as expressed by law and interpreted by the courts.
In many instances, however, the administrators of copyright law find it necessary to
act in areas where Congress and the courts have not yet defined policy. In this they
can have great influence and have often defined important pieces of copyright policy.
The protection of microfilm by administrative decisions, examined in chapter 5, is a
good example of the evolution of copyright through bureaucratic action.
Lastly there is the market place. Occasionally an industry will have the good sense
and luck to be able to balance their competing equities themselves without resorting
to government. A good example of how the different parties decided amongst
themselves how copyright law should be applied is photo-copying. This case is
detailed in chapter 6.
These four bodies do not operate independently of each other but rather function as
separate parts of an integrated whole. For the most part they do not compete with
each other but rather they cooperate in a rather symbiotic relationship. Each has a
unique structure and function that lends it competence and authority in certain areas
and under specific circumstances.
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Chapter 3: Copyvright And The Workings Of Congress
Copyright as an important rule of law was born of a new technology, the printing
press. Early English copyrights were granted by the Star Chamber of Great Britain
with a purpose of imposing censorship rather than of protecting the author.
According to McFarlane (1980, 26) it was the magistrate of Nuremberg who in 1512
first extended copyright protection to the author of a work by confiscating
counterfeits of etchings by Durer. Other than the elimination of censorship as a goal
of copyright, from the time of Gutenburg's great invention in 1451 till the early 1900's
there was little change in the technologies of communications, and as a result little
change in copyright law. In the early part of the twentieth century, however, two
inventions resulted in a burst of innovation that had a major impact on
communications. They were the player piano and the talking machine, as the
phonograph was first know. These inventions created new industries and opened
vast new markets for the authors of the software that fed these machines, music. The
rapid advance of machine technology, the growth of the market, and the impact on
society that played out in the music industry in the early 1900's created the need for
changes in the copyright law.
The growth of the mechanical music business has many parallels with the growth we
are in the midst of today in the computer revolution. In this section we shall explore
the second technological revolution in communications that affected the rule of
copyright, and in particular we shall examine the role Congress played in establishing
copyright policy.
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Music, in the early 1900's, as today, was a major form of entertainment. 2 1 Since
there was no radio or phonograph, sheet music sold for home performance on the
piano or other musical instruments were the major means of providing musical
entertainment. According to Sanjek (1984, 5) Steven Foster's successful song, Old
Folks at Home sold 100,000 copies of sheet music as early as the 1850's. Given the
population at the time, this was equivalent of a million seller today. Till We Meet
Again by Eagan and Whiting sold 3.5 million copies in a few months in 1919. This is
equivalent to selling over 8.1 million copies in a few months today, when only the very
biggest hits sell over 10 million records in total.
In the early 1900's the first American copyright law of 1790 was still in effect with
only minor amendments. This law was appropriate to the circumstances of post-
colonial United States. Most writers and composers of economic importance in the
1700's were Europeans, chiefly English or French. The need existed to encourage
the growth in the U.S. of the most labor and capital intensive and profitable portions
of the publishing business, typesetting and printing. In the service of these needs the
law of 1790 provided no recognition of foreign copyrights. Articles covered by U.S.
copyright had to be typeset and printed here. This had the effect of making the
publishing and selling of books and sheet music quite profitable since there were no
royalties paid to foreign authors who accounted for most published works and there
was no competition from foreign publishers since works had to be manufactured
here.
21The following history of the evolution of the American music business and its
impact on copyright law is largely taken from Sanjek (1984 v2)
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In the music publishing industry the major players joined the Music Publishers
Association, a classic 19T h century trust. The MPA enforced non-discount policies
on retailers and maintained a "courtesy of the trade" policy that gave works of
specific foreign composers to individual MPA members so that they did not compete
directly with each other by publishing the same works. The existence of the trust, like
those in many other segments of the economy by the late 19Th century, was to have a
major impact on the politics of copyright reform and thus the structure of the music
industry ever since.
The anti-competitive atmosphere that prevailed in the music publishing business at
the turn of the 20Th century meant that there was very little need for aggressive
marketing practices. Sales of sheet music were conducted in large part by piano
instructors and the rest primarily through small sheet music shops.
The Piano Roll Case
The Victorian period saw a great growth of manufacturing productivity through the
use of modern manufacturing practices supported by the availability of increasingly
precise machine tools that enabled mass production through the use of
interchangeable parts.22 This modern system of manufacturing required large
amounts of capital, a requirement that caused many industries characterized by large
numbers of small producers to become concentrated. The need for large amounts of
capital and the great efficiencies granted those who had access to capital caused
small producers to be squeezed out or to be acquired by one of the industry leaders.
Prior to the civil war piano manufacture was dispersed across many small producers,
many of them primarily music publishers. By 1880, however, Steinway and Sons was
22The story of the piano roll is again largely from Sanjek (1984 v2)
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responsible for 70% of all pianos sold in the U.S. which they manufactured in their
New York City plant (at the time the second largest building in the country after the
Federal Capital building).
In 1876 a French invention, the pianista, which was the first mechanical piano using
the vacuum principal (Sanjek 1988, 380), was shown at the Philadelphia Exposition.
In 1890 John McTammany, a Worcester, Massachusetts piano mechanic, invented a
mechanical organ designed as a child's toy that was played by turning a crank to
advance the music roll and pumping a bellows to work the organ reeds. His patents
were purchased by the Mechanical Organette Company, which also purchased the
Aeolian Organ Company and the plant of a Boston automatic music roll company.
This company was headed by William B. Tremaine of the New York music-
publishing family. In 1890 he was succeeded by his son, Henry as president.
Henry reorganized these businesses into the Aeolian Organ and Music Company. By
1902 Tremaine was capitalized with over $15,000,000. According to Sanjek (1984, 8),
this was more than the amount invested in the entire American piano and organ
industry just 12 years earlier. To complement this investment in manufacturing
Tremaine put together a modern sales and marketing system. These sales and
marketing systems were being developed at that period to match the large growth in
productive capacity. The music industry was stunned when Aeolian placed a four
color advertisement in Cosmopolitan in 1902 introducing their new player piano.
To ensure a large supply of compositions for his player pianos Tremaine secretly
entered into contracts with all 87 major members of the music publishing trust, the
MPA. These agreements gave Tremaine exclusive rights to the publisher's entire
catalog of music for thirty-five years in return for a 10% royalty on rolls sold. These
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agreements were designed to have a dramatically anti-competitive effect and to
solidify Aeolian's dominance of the player piano business.
Tremaine's secret contracts with the music publishers were hobbled by a major
problem. For Tremaine's contracts to have the desired effect on his competition the
music publishers had to have legal control over the production of piano rolls from
their copyrighted music. This issue, whether an object like a piano roll was an
infringing copy of the printed score for copyright purposes, had never been
adjudicated in the U.S.. Success for Tremaine seemed likely however. In 1902 the
German courts ruled that their 1870 copyright law covered talking machine records,
which seemed like a very good analogy for the piano roll.23 Tremaine agreed to pay
all legal costs for one of the MPA members to take such a case to the Supreme Court
of the United States so that his exclusive contracts would have the desired business
effect. The case Tremaine bank-rolled was Wzite-Smith Music Publishing v. Apollo
Company. Considering the effort that Tremaine put into getting the secret
agreements and the money he was willing to spend on a court case, it seems clear
that he expected to prevail before the bench. In it's October, 1907 term, however,
the Supreme Court ruled against Tremaine and his proxy, White-Smith Music
Publishing.24 The Supreme Court decided that piano rolls which were not human
readable and which it felt were really a part of a machine, did not infringe on the
copyright on the sheet music from which they were recorded. This argument about
23 In fact, it was only the bureaucratic resistance of the Copyright Office that delayed
consideration of the issue in the U.S.. The Copyright Office did not feel equipped to
handle music recordings and refused to accept them which effectively left record
producers with no copyright which could be infringed and thus the courts were never
presented with the issue (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1977).
2 4 It is no coincidence that the Supreme Court ruled in this narrow way during the
middle of Congressional efforts to draft a new copyright law. The courts often pass
issues to Congress when they know that timely legislative consideration is likely.
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the copyrightability of machine-readable works which seem to be part of a machine
will come to the fore again eighty years later as it relates to computer software. But
meanwhile, in 1907, Tremaine and the MPA had a problem and turned from the
courts to Congress for a solution.
The Politics Of Copyright Reform
The first copyright statute of the United States was passed in 1790. Major revisions
were passed in 1831 and 1870. By 1901 the Register of Copyrights, Thorvald
Solberg, was lobbying for another general revision of the statutes in his annual report
and suggested that Congress appoint a commission of interested parties to draft a
new law, according to a U.S. Copyright Office report(1960). Congress instead
suggested that the Librarian of Congress, Dr. Herbert Putnam, with the advice of a
conference of the various interests involved, draft a new law. Represented on the
committee were:
"authors, dramatists, theater managers, architects, artists, composers,
book publishers, directory publishers, newspaper publishers, periodical
publishers, photoengravers, print publishers, printers, educational
institutes, public libraries, advertising agencies, bar associations, and a
few miscellaneous groups" (U.S. Copyright Office 1960, 2)
Conspicuously missing from this long list of interested parties were manufacturers of
mechanical music machines. In May, 1906, the Librarian of Congress presented his
draft legislation to the 59Th Session of Congress. Among other changes, the draft
made it illegal to perform a dramatic or musical composition for profit without
permission of the copyright holder. In addition it gave to copyright holders control
over any mechanical device whatsoever designed to reproduce for the ear any such
work. Hearings were held in June and December before a joint committee of
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members of the House and Senate Committees on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyright. The New York Times reported on December 11 that Mark Twain spoke
for 5 hours before Congress in support of the new bill. John Philip Sousa told
Congress he wrote better music when he was better paid and Victor Herbert testified
on behalf of the mechanical music rights provision (Sanjek 1988 v2 398). C. Howlett
Davis brought progress towards passage of the bill to a halt when he testified in
opposition, referring to a "complete monopolistic octopus, in which the Aeolian
Company forms the head and brains, and the Music Publishers Association the body,
the independent publishers the writing arms, and the composers the suckers and
baiters." (Sanjek 1988 v2 398) This testimony, coming in an era of intense anti-trust
sentiment, caused sufficient controversy to end consideration of the bill for that
session.
In the 60Th Session of Congress two laws were introduced, one similar to the bill that
failed to pass in the 59Th Congress, favorable to composers and publishers, and one
favorable to manufacturers. Negotiations were stalemated. Final hearings began in
March, 1908, one month after the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in White-
Smith. This ruling made it imperative to that composers seek a compromise that
would gain some copyright protection to cover mechanically reproduced music.
Copyright Act Of 1909: The Nature Of The Compromise
A requirement for a compulsory license was added to the proposed legislation that
forced a composer to license anyone who wanted to perform a composition once he
first licensed it. Also proposed was a royalty rate of two cents a recording. A clause
was added that would terminate any copyright upon involvement of the copyright
owner in actions in violation of state or national laws concerning trusts or
monopolies. The composers felt that the two cent rate was too low but accepted it in
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order to get the law passed. Manufacturers competing with Aeolian accepted the
law because it invalidated Aeolian's exclusive agreements with the MPA members.
Aeolian, although it lost its exclusive contracts, would pay only $.02 per recording
rather than the $.10 to $.20 that it would have paid under the 10% royalty rates they
had offered the MPA. Congress accepted the law as politically palatable because of
its anti-trust provisions. The law was approved by Congress on the last day of the
60T h Session and was signed into law by Theodore Roosevelt in his last five minutes
as President.
Even in the face of intense pressure from a wide range of interests to conclude a
much needed reform of the copyright statute, and convenient political cover in the
form of strong public anti-trust sentiment, the Congress was unable to agree on
legislation until the parties involved in the mechanical music dispute reached
agreement among themselves. The compulsory licensing provision of the 1909 law
proved to be a durable compromise which is still governing music publishing today.25
By providing adequate compensation to authors of music while allowing access to
compositions to all interested performers, the compulsory license has helped ensure
the vibrant growth of the music business from 1909 to the present. Compulsory
licensing of user interface software look and feel could help assure similar results in
the software business today.
25The mechanical music compulsory license was unique until 1976. Today there are
five others covering 1) cable T.V. access to programming, 2) jukebox access to music,
3) public broadcast station access to certain types of copyright material, 4) satellite
carrier access to programming, and 5) record rental access to recordings. This last
has never been implemented because of objection from the record manufacturers.
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Chapter 4: The Courts: Motion Pictures
The courts, in their role as interpreter of precedent, legislative intent and accepted
social values in specific instances of conflict, often have the opportunity, and
sometimes indeed face the need, to break new ground in formulating public policy.
The courts today are proving the major arena for sorting through the issues of
software copyright. To better understand what the courts can be expected to
contribute to today's problems I will examine one case where the courts set copyright
policy: the application of copyright to motion pictures.
Many of the same issues we face today regarding software occurred relative to
motion pictures. Are motion pictures protected by copyright? What about the use of
copyrighted material, musical and literary, in motion pictures? What rights are
assigned to the copyright owner? These issue were all decided by the courts.
The first question was the copyrightability of motion pictures. The issue arose in
1903 in the case of Edison v. Lubin. In this case Thomas Edison claimed copyright
protection for a series of 4500 photographs that, when projected through a machine,
showed the launching of Kaiser Wilhelm's new yacht. The Federal District Court
took a strict constructionist point of view and ruled that whereas each of the 4500
photos might have been individually registered and protected, the work as a whole
could not be. The District Court admitted that the law might be defective in not
mentioning motion pictures, but left it to Congress to rectify the flaw if indeed there
was one. On appeal the Circuit Court disagreed and extended protection to Edison's
movie as a photograph. Just to make sure that Edison's work would be protected
they also said that the movie was a work of fine art, another category protected under
the 1870 law.
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Why were the courts willing to make a liberal interpretation of the statutes to protect
motion pictures in 1903 when they were not willing to do so with piano rolls in 1909?
There are three primary reasons for this which have been observed by Olson (1989
110) to be common in the formulation of copyright policy by the courts.
The first stems from the nature of the legal system. Congress almost exclusively deals
with issues at the policy level and seldom passes significant legislation that addresses
the level of specific cases. The courts are just the opposite. They operate almost
totally on the level of specific cases and do not generally set about making policy,
although the cumulative weight of specific rulings does add up to policy and the
courts generally explain the policy basis of individual rulings. This means the courts
are more apt to advance policy in cases that involve specific individuals within the
same class, such as the two marketers of motion pictures in the Edison case, rather
than in cases which involve the balance between two different classes of society, such
as the composers and mechanical music machine manufacturers in the White-Smith
case.
Another factor affecting the court's willingness to make new policy is the accident of
the details of the specific case which first presents the policy issue. Again it is
important to note that the courts operate entirely within the specifics of the cases
presented to it. The specific details of the case that first frames an issue before the
courts can have a significant impact on.its willingness to act. As Oliver Wendle
Holmes (1881 1) said, "The life of law is not logic but experience." For example, the
Edison case had one party trying to expropriate the considerable effort and creativity
of another, whereas it could not have been lost on the courts that White-Smith
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involved someone trying to obtain a monopoly of available musical composition from
an industry trust.
The last explanation for the difference in the willingness of the courts to make new
law in it's rulings has to do with an accident of timing. When the court ruled on
White-Smith, Congress was in the midst of considering a comprehensive review of the
copyright law, whereas the hearings to revise the copyright statutes did not begin
until 1905, two years after the ruling in Edison. It seems reasonable to speculate that
the urge to pass the responsibility for fixing obvious problems to Congress for
resolution will be stronger when there is reason to believe quick action may be
forthcoming.
Oddly, in formulating the major copyright revision of 1909, Congress left out any
mention of motion pictures despite their well known existence and the earlier court
rulings. One can only imagine that this was an oversight based on their general
approval of the policy set by the courts in Edison. In 1912 Congress amended the act
of 1909 to include motion pictures as a protected class. They did not make any
changes to section 1 of the statute, which outlines the rights reserved to copyright
owners. Section 1 reserves the right to make copies of all classes of works to the
copyright owner but reserves the public performance rights only to written dramatic
works and musical compositions. The effect of the 1912 amendment was thus to
prevent unauthorized copying of motion pictures but seemingly to allow no control
over the public performance for profit of legally acquired copies.
Given this precarious state of affairs, the courts would soon get a chance to sort
things out. In Tiffany Productions v. Dewing the question presented was whether the
exhibition of a film beyond the times and places specified in the license was an
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infringement of copyright. While the Supreme Court's ruling in White-Smith was
reversed by Congress to protect musical composition from infringement by
publication of records or piano rolls, its assertion that the performance of a record or
piano roll was not publication was still in effect. This presented an obstacle to the
court in Tiffany, since the easy way to protect the rights of the copyright holder - by
declaring that any performance of the movie was publication -- was contradicted by
the Supreme Court. The court recognized that as a practical matter it was important
to protect the performance rights of the copyright holder and went on a fishing
expedition to find grounds to support that protection. They settled on allowing that
while Congress had explicitly mentioned dramatic works and motion pictures as
separate classes of works in section 5, which lists copyrightable works, they meant to
include motion pictures as a form of dramatic work in section 1 where they reserved
the performance rights of certain classes of work. This seems to be a dubious
conclusion from a logical point of view, but it supported the right conclusion in the
case at hand on the basis of experience. Again we see the courts making policy
decisions based on the specifics of individual cases before it. This court ruling lasted
as a basis for protecting the performance of motion pictures until 1976 when
Congress specifically included them in the performance rights section of new
legislation.
In 1946 the question arose, in Jerome v. Twentieth Century Fox, whether the
compulsory license provisions of the act of 1909 applied to motion picture sound
tracks. The act, as we have seen in chapter 3, created a compulsory license for any.
musical composition once published and explicitly mentions phonographs, piano-
playing instruments and other "purely mechanical" means. Plausibly, motion picture
sound tracks might have been seen as one of these "purely mechanical" means and
thus have been covered under the license. The court, looking at the specific details
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of the case, however, noted that a mere 500 prints of a motion picture were all that
were needed to allow coast to coast exhibition of a successful movie and would net
the composer a mere $10.00. Again we can see the court acting on the specifics of
the case at hand rather than operating at the abstract policy level.
This de facto policy formulation through specific cases has served us poorly in the
case of computer software. The ill-advised rulings relative to computer software we
saw in chapter 1 were in part the result of the court's broad use of copyright to justify
rulings motivated by specifics of the case at hand.2 6 For instance, in the case of
Whielan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc27, which was a landmark
case expanding copyright coverage to the non-literal structure and sequence of a
program, the defendant, Jaslow, who was found to have infringed on the work of
Whelan, obtained a copy of Whelan's source code surreptitiously without Whelan's
knowledge or consent. This sort of nasty behavior calls out for punishment and may
predispose a judge to rule more widely against the perpetrator than is necessary or
wise.
26See Clapes' (1989) discussion of Wielan and SAS for details.
27Wzelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc. 609 FSupp 1307 (E.D.
Pa. 1985)
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Chapter 5: The Bureaucracy - Microfilm
The bureaucratic structures of the Executive branch of government also exert an
influence over the formulation of copyright policy and practice. The most important
of these organizations is the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress. The
Copyright Office administers the system whereby writings are registered for
copyright. Registration is not necessary to obtain a copyright. Common law
copyright2 8 comes into existence as soon as a work is created and is preempted by
Federal law as soon as the work is fixed in a tangible medium(Strong 1990 68).
Federal copyright comes into existence as soon as a work is fixed in a tangible
medium, written down, etched, painted or whatever. However you must register a
work to bring suit to enforce a copyright. You can not get awards of attorney's fees
or statutory damages for any infringement that takes place before registration, and
you can not collect royalties from any of the compulsory licenses like the one for
music discussed above in chapter 3.
Most of the time the Copyright Office follows the lead of the Congress and the
Courts in administering the workings of the copyright system, but occasionally a
situation arises where Congress and the courts have not addressed issues facing the
Copyright Office and thus they have to make their own determination of the law.
These determinations often create policy.
One example of administrative policy making copyright law can be seen in the area
of microfilm. In this instance the Copyright Office was presented with copyrightable
textual material on microfilm for deposit as part of the registration of copyright. In
28Common law copyright is governed by state law and adjudicated through state
courts.
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pview of the Supreme Court ruling in White-Smith that an object must be humanly
perceivable to qualify as a copy, the applicability of copyright to microfilm was
unclear. The Copyright Office decided, perhaps in part because handling them is an
easy task, to accept microfilm for registration. This policy was not challenged in
court and has become an accepted part of copyright practice. In recognition of this
acceptance Congress later included microfilm as a protected media in the 1976 act.
Other executive agencies can also get involved in copyright issues. For example, the
Federal Communications Commission has played an important role in resolving the
issue of re-transmission of copyrighted material over cable television systems. In
1968 and again in 1974, the Supreme Court ruled that cable system operators were
not infringing when they broadcast copyright material, thus freeing cable systems
from any need to pay for the material they broadcast.29 This ruling set in motion
political action on the part of the copyright owners to get legislation that would
change this situation and force cable systems to pay. Congress, however, rarely
imposes pain on a legitimate interest group, which cable operators surely are,
regardless of the compelling logic of business or policy factors. The cable operators'
opposition in Congress stalled any action on this issue from 1968 till 1976, leaving the
cable operators free to operate without making royalty payments. Finally the FCC,
which felt the effect of these court rulings was unfair, stopped licensing the expansion
of cable systems in major metropolitan areas. This action was a serious blow to cable
operators which forced them to come to terms with program originators. Resolution
of this conflict allowed Congress to pass the Copyright Act of 1976. The Act created
a compulsory license to allow cable access to programming and set up the Copyright
29In Fortzightly Corporation v United Artists Television. (US SupCt 1968) 158 USPQ 1
and Teleprompter Corporation et al. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. et al. (US
SupCt 1974) 181 USPQ 65 the court reasoned that cable systems were on the viewer
side of the line between performance and viewer.
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Royalty Tribunal to set payment rates for this privilege. This model of compulsory
licensing based on rates set by an impartial third party offers a possible solution for
achieving a practical balance in the software look and feel cases.
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Chapter 6: Industry Practice - The Copy Machine
It is sometimes the case that the various parties involved in a copyright dispute can
come together and formulate voluntary rules that become an accepted part of
copyright practice without the intervention of the courts. These agreements
sometimes become codified in legislation at a later time. In the computer industry
voluntary industry standards that are negotiated by committees of both users and
manufacturers have played an important role in striking a balance between
innovation and stability. These standards often start with the copyrighted work of
one company that is put in the public domain or licensed at a nominal cost as part of
the standard setting process. Such standards may come to play an important role in
user interface design in time. To see how this sort of process may unfold, we can
look at photocopying, whose impact on copyright has played out over the last 55
years.
Control over the use of photocopying presents a good example of how industry
groups can come together to voluntarily formulate copyright practice. The Copyright
act of 1909 gave authors exclusive rights to copy their works. In the early 1930's
technology like mimeographs and photostat machines became available to libraries.
Since these machines were expensive and inconvenient to operate libraries used
them only in isolated and limited situations. Even so, publishers recognized the
potential infringement of their copyrights. In 1935 an informal group of publishers,
scholarly and research organizations, and libraries got together and issued a
statement known as the "Gentlemen's Agreement." The agreement outlined
circumstances under which a library might reasonably make copies of books and
periodicals. This agreement had no binding effect because the signatories were not
officials of any groups representing the concerned parties, but nevertheless the
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agreement became accepted industry practice. This industry self-regulation was so
satisfactory to all involved that when hearings were held in Congress in 1960, in
preparation for a general revision of the copyright law, the parties involved told
Congress that the new law should not address photo-copying as they preferred to
work out an agreement among themselves.
By 1970 the disparity between the low cost of copy machine output and the high cost
of subscriptions to scholarly journals was putting pressure on the thirty-five year old
Gentlemen's Agreement. In 1971 the Williams and Wilkens Company brought suit
against the National Institute of Health's library and the National Medical Library,
both organs of the U.S. Government, for wholesale copying of its medical journals
for distribution to the staff of the Institute, medical libraries, and practitioners
around the country.3 0 The Commissioner of the Court of Claims ruled that the
copying was beyond the realm of fair use and was an infringement of Wilkens's
copyright. The full Court disagreed and found for the NIH. Typical of their rulings
in matters involving individuals in different classes the court did not make new policy.
Instead it called for Congressional treatment of these issues saying "Finally, but not
least of all, we underline again the need for Congressional treatment of the problems
of photocopying."3 1 In 1976, when Congress was finishing its general revision of the
copyright law, it pressured the parties involved into reaching an agreement on these
issues that was embodied in section 108 of the statute. Thus the 1935 Gentlemen's
Agreement was the rule on fair use of photocopying for forty years.
30Idem
31Williams and Wilkens Co. v. United States. 1973 (487 FSupp 2d 1345)
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Chapter 7: Computer copyright: Conclusions
The mechanics of protecting computer software through copyright involves many
unresolved questions and issues. The direction taken by some Appeals Courts are, I
have claimed, misguided. If not corrected, these interpretations of the law will cost
computer users in the United States, which is really to say the entire economy, dearly.
So what then are the possibilities for putting copyright practice back on a more
equitable track? What does what we have seen of the evolution of copyright law and
practice imply about these various possibilities?
The plain necessity is to achieve a balance in the law that recognizes the computer
users' investment in learning to user software products. This could be done by any of
the four agencies that we have looked at above. Let's look at each and see what
history tells us of the likely limits of their impact on this problem.
How Can Congress Help
There have been several suggestions put forward regarding possible Congressional
action. Brown (1988 997) suggests doing away with copyright altogether as the basis
for protecting software and drafting new legislation specifically to deal with it. A
major advantage that copyright has over some newly created law is the wide
international recognition that copyright has attained. All the significant industrial
countries of the world are members of the Berne Convention, which sets minimum
standards that they must all adhere to. The Berne Convention does not solve the
problems we are discussing here, but it does give a very firm foundation of basics at
an international level. It would be daunting indeed to attempt to overthrow
copyright as the basis of software protection world-wide and build a consensus for a
total replacement. We have seen how hard it is for Congress to act in the face of
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conflicts between legitimate parties. It is virtually impossible to see how this conflict
could be resolved at the international level given the contentiousness of the issues
involved. Thus Brown's suggestion seems very naive and impractical.
Karjala (1988) mentions the possibility that some form of compulsory license might
be the basis for resolving the look and feel controversy. This idea has great intrinsic
merit. A body like the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (see page 38) could assign royalty
rates for user interfaces that authors wanted to use. Thus access to successful
interfaces would be assured and their authors would be rewarded for their use. A
truly innovative interface that was easy to learn and use would deserve a high royalty
since the users' investment in it would be low, whereas the interfaces for less clever
programs that take much user effort to master would fetch lower royalties. This idea,
as with other suggestions for legislative remedy, fail however on the practical ground
that absent widespread agreement between the legitimate parties, which surely does
not exist, Congress has shown a historic inability to act. Before any legislative action
is likely to be taken, some external event will have to occur to force compromise on
all parties. A Supreme Court ruling with drastic effect, like White-Smith, is an
example of such an event. It is estimated that Microsoft Windows will have 9 million
users by the end 1991. If Apple Computer's suit against Microsoft prevails and has a
dramatic impact on those 9 million users by causing Microsoft to recall the product
or significantly change it's interface the affected users could become the political
force that makes Congress address this issue.
The Role of the Bureaucracy in Software Copyright
I do not see an important role for the Copyright Office in this matter. The
disagreement between the constituencies involved are too complex and deep seated
for such a bureaucratic organization to be able to air the issues and to develop a
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consensus. The Copyright Office can continue to apply pressure for a solution and
limit the damage caused until one is found. This seems to be the effect of their
refusal to accept computer screens for registration whatever their other motivations
might have been.
Another role for the bureaucracy of the Executive branch is in forcing the acceptance
of industry standards. For instance, the Department of Defense forced the
acceptance of a standardized version of the COBOL programming language by
stating that they would not buy systems that did not comply. The impact of their
buying power caused every major computer vendor to support the standard.
The Impact Of Industry Practice
The major impact of computer industry practice on copyright has been in the area of
voluntary industry standards. When a technology begins to become mature and
stable, users begin to see the value of standardization. This standardization typically
results in lower costs, easier training and greater life span for the involved products.
Vendors can react to the pressure for standards in one of three ways. By opposing
the standards and enhancing their proprietary products to make the proposed
standards look relatively unattractive, they can, if they are influential enough, hope to
derail the move towards standards and thus maintain their competitive advantage.
They may also decide to put their technology in the public domain and propose that
it be used as the basis of the standard. This approach protects their investment if
standards seem inevitable. It can also present a competitive advantage while the
standards are evolving until competitors develop products of their own that are
compliant with the standards. This is often a means of attacking against an
important competitor with an entrenched proprietary product. Finally, the followers
in a product area will often enthusiastically embrace a proposed standard, since it
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can offer them a way to effectively catch up with the industry leader at a relatively
low cost and risk.
Unfortunately, the area of most contention relative to copyright, the user interface, is
one of the least mature. User interface technology is evolving rapidly with window
and mouse based products being announced almost daily. The Apple Macintosh,
Microsoft's Windows 3.0, IBM's OS/2 Presentation Manager as well as a variety of
Unix based windowing systems are all competing vigorously with no clear winner in
sight. Multi-media and hyper-text based applications are just now emerging from the
drawing board and are sure to keep the user interface area in rapid flux for years to
come. Given this, there is no reason to believe industry standards will play a
significant role in the resolving our look and feel problems.
The Court's Role
Trying their best to follow the unclear wishes of Congress the court have led us to the
problems we face today. Ironically, the courts also have great promise as sources of
the solution to this problem. We have cited some recent cases in the look and feel
area that are mis-guided and are likely to cause continuing problems. These cases
have all been decided at the District or Circuit level and thus are not definitive.
Many Circuit courts have not been heard from, thus leaving most District courts to
continue searching on their own for a better balance of the interests involved. Since
these cases are presented to the courts as conflicts between two parties of the same
class they are of a type, as we have seen earlier, that can lead the courts to feel more
comfortable taking an activist role in setting new legal precedent. There is much
unexplored ground that the courts have yet to cover that may yield better law.
Karjala (1989 33-96) explores past rulings that could be grounds to support a
narrower interpretation of the copyright law, among them:
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o The severe limitations in the copyright protection of utilitarian objects
which are protected only to the extent that their esthetic aspect can be
identified separately from their utilitarian aspects.
o The limitation of protection of factual or technical works to only near
verbatim copying.
o The refusal of the courts to allow the monopolization of non-
patentable utilitarian objects through copyright and other legal
means.3 2
o The legislative exclusion of "processes" from copyright protection.
The last has clearly not been heard from courts on the issue of protection of
computer software. We must hope that they will either resist the direction set in the
early cases discussed here or drop a bomb like W7ite-Smith that would force a
compromise among the parties involved which might lead to legislative action.
Clearly then, it is to the Court that we must look for progress in the look and feel
area. It is important that interested parties become involved in the judicial process,
for that is the only important game in town
32 For instance, chart recorders, Brown Instrument Company v. Warner., 161 FSupp 2d
910 (D.C. Cir. 1947) and electrical plugs, Harvey Hubbell, Inc. v. General Electric Co.,
262 FSupp 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1919)
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Appendix 1: Notes on legal bibliography abbreviations
Abbreviations
CCH Comp Law
F.Supp.
US SupCt
USC
USPQ
Definitions
Commerce Clearing House Computer Law - A for profit
periodical of important rulings on computer related law.
The Federal Supplement - Publishes important District Court
rulings. District Court rulings are not usually published.
United States Supreme Court Reporter - A periodical
publication of all Supreme Court rulings.
United States Codes - Laws passed by the Congress of the
United States.
United States Patent Quarterly - A publication covering
important patent and copyright related rulings.
The abbreviations in parenthesis after the journal reference identify the specific
district or circuit court. Thus "Wzelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories,
Inc. 609 FSupp 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985)" refers to the ruling by the District Court of
Eastern Pennsylvania in the case Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratories, Inc. published in volume 609 of the Federal Supplement on page 1307.
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